




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SEPTEMBER 2021

LET THE POLICE POLICE, AND LET ENTREPRENEURS HANDLE THE REST

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Montreal Economic Institute

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HIGHLIGHTS

Crime rates in Canada have seen a modest upswing over the past few years. This reversal, combined with swelling costs, has required a balancing act between harmonizing fiscal responsibility and the need to fight crime. The time is thus ripe to examine the appropriateness of certain tasks being carried out by highly trained, highly skilled police officers. Supplementing the police force with licensed security professionals can ease budgetary pressures, increase overall police efficiency, reduce crime, and increase job satisfaction for police.

Chapter 1 – Licensed Security Personnel to the Rescue

- Core policing services require a combination of physical, cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal skills for which police receive extensive training. Yet it is estimated that less than 10% of the tasks police officers carry out are highly demanding of all of these skills.
- The demands on officers in non-core areas have increased over time, and the roles and responsibilities of police services in non-criminal areas have expanded—an example of mission creep.
- A 2005 analysis of thirty years of police service data in British Columbia revealed that overall, officers spend 40% of their time on administrative tasks and report writing, not counting the additional hour of unpaid overtime per officer spent on paperwork daily.
- Certain non-core elements of police work do not require the authority, specialized training, or credibility of a police officer and can easily be taken over by licensed security personnel. This frees up officers to refocus on their core tasks and fight crime.
- Security personnel offer a number of services that lend themselves well to bolstering police forces in four major operational categories: administration, investigative support, areas involving highly specialized and technical knowledge, and uniformed services with limited police powers.
- There is public support for the idea of contracting out certain tasks. In a 2017 poll, a majority of Canadians (59%) agreed with private security companies performing support tasks currently being carried out by police officers.

Chapter 2 – Potential Reforms: Case Studies

- We propose a number of reforms in line with the areas of public support. Modelled through case studies in Alberta and Quebec, we illustrate how security personnel can be utilized by police forces to reduce costs without reducing quality.
- Alberta has a total of 7,687 police officers, with an average yearly compensation of over \$133,000. In Quebec, the median yearly compensation for the province's 15,622 police officers is nearly \$117,000. In comparison, a security professional draws a yearly compensation of just under \$53,000 in Alberta, and just over \$49,000 in Quebec.
- Each year, there are over six million hours in Alberta, and nearly thirteen million in Quebec, in which these highly-trained officers are being paid handsomely to write reports and complete other paperwork and time-consuming administrative tasks.
- Security personnel could also be used as an auxiliary force for a number of different activities carried out by officers in the "gendarmerie" branch of the Quebec police without major complications, at least to some degree.
- We estimate a possible reduction in Quebec taxpayers' burden of between \$525 million and \$615 million per year. These numbers represent a potential of between 17% and 20% in reduced annual operating expenditures.
- Traffic management is another area where security personnel can easily support Alberta police officers, carrying out tasks like patrolling, directing traffic, and responding to the scene of a collision.
- We anticipate a reduced Alberta taxpayer burden of between \$171 million and \$225 million per year. These numbers represent a potential of between 11% and 14% in reduced annual operating expenditures.

Chapter 3 – The Gradual Integration of Security Personnel

- The introduction of security personnel into established police forces would be gradual, slowly replacing some retiring officers and some of those

who leave the force for other reasons. As a result, the savings too would increase gradually.

- As police officers are increasingly able to focus on the core tasks of the job thanks to the offloading of additional tasks and the curtailing of mission creep, their job satisfaction will increase, and with it their motivation and the quality of policing. Conversely, absenteeism and turnover rates should decrease.
- Increased job satisfaction and reduced turnover will have a positive impact not only on the communities in which these officers serve, but also on the public purse once again through reduced training and management costs.
- Looking to entrepreneurs to support the police in a complementary fashion is a strategy that has been tried in a number of places. In the United Kingdom, evidence has shown that such contracting out does indeed allow police officers to refocus on their core tasks, which increased the quality of services provided to the community.
- In 2012, for instance, the Lincolnshire Police signed a 10-year contract with G4S, a private security company. By outsourcing the administrative duties and some minor tasks to G4S, they were able to save over £5 million (C\$6.8 million) in their first year, and the crime rate fell by 14%.
- As fiscal pressures continue to mount, acknowledging and utilizing the resources and support available through highly trained and qualified security personnel is a must.

CHAPTER 1

Licensed Security Personnel to the Rescue

After declining steadily since about 1990, crime rates in Canada have seen a modest upswing over the past few years.¹ This reversal, combined with swelling costs at both the municipal and provincial levels, has required a balancing act between harmonizing fiscal responsibility and the need to fight crime. There is also growing public scrutiny of the roles and responsibilities of police officers and the changing context in which they work.

The time is thus ripe to examine the appropriateness of certain tasks being carried out by highly trained, highly skilled police officers. Indeed, increasing amounts of officers' time is spent on non-core police duties, which is hardly the best use of these scarce resources. Supplementing the police force with licensed security professionals can ease budgetary pressures and reduce costs for taxpayers, while increasing overall police efficiency and actually reducing crime. As a non-negligible bonus, it may also increase job satisfaction for police.

Core vs. Non-Core Police Services and Tasks

Core policing services are those related to the enforcement of laws, criminal investigation, and emergency response. These core services require a combination of physical, cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal skills for which police receive extensive training.² Yet it is estimated that less than 10% of the tasks police officers carry out are highly demanding of all of these skills.³ Those that do tend to be related to activities with a high potential for violence, including (but not limited to) the apprehension of dangerous offenders, serving arrest warrants, intervening while a crime is in progress, responding to a street fight, pursuing vehicles, or apprehending DUI suspects. Research has shown that only

about 20% of an officer's time is devoted to core police services.⁴

Non-core police tasks are those that do not require full powers of arrest; do not require expert skills but rely on special equipment (such as fingerprinting, security clearances); do not require specialized training or a high degree of physical fitness (funeral escorts, guard duty); involve focused training but not specific physical prowess or emotional or interpersonal skills (dispatching police vehicles); or are of a temporary nature (event patrol).⁵ The demands on officers in these non-core areas have increased over time, and the roles and responsibilities of police services in non-criminal areas have expanded—an example of mission creep.

Core policing services require a combination of physical, cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal skills for which police receive extensive training.

In Ontario, for example, about 44% of the Ontario Provincial Police detachment workforce were not delivering front-line police services in 2012,⁶ while in Saskatchewan in 2016, more than two-thirds of police time was spent responding to non-criminal matters.⁷ Police officers are increasingly becoming involved in events and with tasks that fall within the mandate of other municipal and provincial agencies. Officers are being asked to do more with less, and while this may appear to have some short-term merit, the longer-term impact could have negative effects on police morale.⁸

Indeed, recent calls to “defund the police” have drawn particular attention to the ever-expanding role of police officers and the mismatch between those trained to

1. Greg Moreau, Brianna Jaffray, and Amelia Armstrong, “Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2019,” Canadian Centre for Justice and Community Safety Statistics, Statistics Canada, October 29, 2020.

2. Daniel M. Blumberg et al., “New Directions in Police Academy Training: A Call to Action,” *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, Vol. 16, No. 24, 2019, p. 1.

3. Authors' calculations. Marcia Chaiken and Jan Chaiken, *Public Policing—Privately Provided*, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice, 1987, pp. 33-41, Tables C1 to C6, cited in Mathieu Bédard and Jasmin Guénette, “Private Reinforcements for Public Police,” MEI, Economic Note, January 29, 2015.

4. Gordon Marnoch, Gavin Boyd, and John Topping, “Mission creep and the compromising of strategic direction in United Kingdom Police Services: An exploratory study of the evidence,” Paper presented at the European Group for Public Administration, Toulouse, France, September 8 to 10, 2010, p. 2.

5. Marcia Chaiken and Jan Chaiken, *op. cit.*, footnote 3, p. 8.

6. Office of the Auditor General of Ontario, *2012 Annual Report*, Fall 2012, p. 232.

7. Benjamin Mazowita and Cristine Rotenberg, “The Canadian Police Performance Metrics Framework: Standardized indicators for police services in Canada,” Statistics Canada, September 11, 2019.

8. Rick Ruddell and Nicholas A. Jones, *The Economics of Canadian Policing: Five Years into the Great Recession*, Collaborative Centre for Justice and Safety, March 31, 2014, p. 24.

carry out core policing services and auxiliary tasks that would be better handled by other professionals.

A 2005 analysis of thirty years of police service data in British Columbia revealed that over time, the administrative demands on officers had increased considerably. Overall, officers spend 40% of their time on administrative tasks and report writing, not counting the additional hour of unpaid overtime per officer spent on paperwork daily.⁹ Due to a number of judicial decisions that increased the required number of steps and handling in certain types of crimes, the amount of paperwork and administration undertaken in relation to the crime itself has also increased.¹⁰ For example, the number of steps required to handle a DUI case increased 45% over the 30-year period, with each case now requiring 400% more time.¹¹

Incorporating Licensed Security Personnel

Certain non-core elements of police work do not require the authority, specialized training, or credibility of a police officer and can easily be taken over by licensed security personnel.¹² This frees up officers to refocus on their core tasks and fight crime, while also helping contain ballooning costs. It can also boost officer morale through increased job satisfaction, leading to higher quality performance and lower absenteeism and turnover rates.¹³

Over the past few years, increasing numbers of civilian personnel have been integrated into police forces in such non-core roles,¹⁴ but these positions remain administered by the public sector. Thus, the government maintains complete responsibility for producing the service, which includes training, management, quality con-

trol, and all other aspects of service delivery. In addition to expensive front-line management, higher costs result from stunted efficiency due to the absence of competitive bidding. While such “civilianization” is a step in the right direction toward liberating officers from non-core tasks, the contracting out of these tasks to security services would also offload some of the overhead costs of the public sector, while still allowing the government to set performance standards through the competitive bidding process.¹⁵

While security personnel have limited powers of arrest, search, and detention as per section 494 of the *Criminal Code of Canada*, they do offer a number of services (see Table 1-1) that lend themselves well to bolstering police forces in four major operational categories: administration, investigative support, areas involving highly specialized and technical knowledge, and uniformed services with limited police powers.¹⁶ Both security personnel and the police prevent and respond to antisocial behavior and crime; their roles, therefore, are often complementary.

A 2005 analysis in British Columbia revealed that overall, officers spend 40% of their time on administrative tasks and report writing.

In addition to performance management guidelines, the competitive bidding process would allow the public sector to retain a reasonable amount of control over who wins the contract, how services are executed, and how performance is measured, as well as the authority and ability to replace the contractor in cases of outright performance failure.¹⁷ Furthermore, these professionals are governed by security-related acts and regulations which monitor the private security industry while improving accountability and enhancing public safety and security.¹⁸ Security personnel are also subject to additional requirements and regulations, and basic training standards

9. The study concludes that the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada, which apply to the entire country, are the primary reason why officers devote more time to these tasks. Aili Malm *et al.*, “Research Summary Report: A 30 Year Analysis of Police Service Delivery and Costing,” Centre for Criminal Justice Research, University College of the Fraser Valley, August 2005, p. 9.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-16.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-19.

12. In Canada, security personnel are required to be licensed. The requirements for licensing vary province to province, however the general process requires a set amount of provincially approved training followed by testing and application. Paladin Security, “How to become a security guard,” consulted July 15, 2021.

13. Henry L. Tosi, John Rizzo, and Neal P. Mero, *Managing Organizational Behavior*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2000, pp. 134-135, cited in Jae Vanden Berghe, *Job Satisfaction and Job Performance at the Work Place*, Arcada, Degree Thesis International Business, 2011, p. 18.

14. This process, whereby civilian personnel are integrated into the police force in roles previously held by police officers, is referred to as “civilianization.” Curt Taylor Griffiths *et al.*, *Civilianization in the Vancouver Police Department*, Vancouver Police Department, March 13, 2006, p. 8; John Kiedrowski *et al.*, *The Civilianization of Police in Canada*, Public Safety Canada, 2015, pp. 11-15.

15. Simon Domberger and Paul Jensen, “Contracting out by the Public Sector: Theory, Evidence, Prospects,” *Oxford Review of Economic Policy*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1997, p. 68.

16. These categories are outlined as optimal for civilianization and thus also lend themselves well to contracting out. John Kiedrowski *et al.*, *op. cit.*, footnote 14, p. 14.

17. Simon Domberger and Paul Jensen, *op. cit.*, footnote 15, p. 68.

18. Ruth Montgomery and Curt Taylor Griffiths, *The Use of Private Security Services for Policing*, Public Safety Canada, 2015, p. 48.

Table 1-1

Roles and services provided by private security companies in Canada	
Guard and protective services	Emergency management
Surveillance	Crowd and access control
Investigation	Other specialized services
Theft, fraud, and loss prevention	Airport security services (pre-board screening and securing vulnerable areas)
Asset and physical protection	Administrative support
Human safety and security	Risk management and breach prevention
Operational support	Cyber security
Security consulting, assessment	Alarm response
Threat assessment and risk analysis	Cash services

Note: This is not an exhaustive list of security services or roles provided by private operators across Canada.

Sources: GardaWorld, Security Services, consulted April 15, 2021; GPS Security Group, Services, consulted April 15, 2021; Paladin Security, Security Services, consulted July 15, 2021.

assure their competence and accountability, and that services are delivered professionally.¹⁹

A majority of Canadians (59%) agreed with private security companies performing support tasks currently being carried out by police officers.

There is public support for the idea of contracting out certain tasks. In a 2017 poll, a majority of Canadians (59%) agreed with private security companies performing support tasks currently being carried out by police officers. Support varies depending on the kind of task, however. While just over one in three Canadians (37%) are enthusiastic about private security companies securing crime scenes, six in ten (58%) are comfortable with private security firms performing administrative tasks at the police station (legal identification, administrative support, and facility management), and 70% are comfortable with contractors handling traffic management.²⁰

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-56.

20. Ipsos, "Survey on the use of security firms in support of police services," November 2017, pp. 4-6.

CHAPTER 2

Potential Reforms: Case Studies

To both reduce costs for taxpayers and roll back mission creep for officers, we propose a number of reforms in line with the areas of public support. Modelled through case studies in Alberta and Quebec, we illustrate how security personnel can be utilized by police forces to reduce costs without reducing quality. These provinces were chosen because both employ large numbers of personnel in vastly different environments (metropolitan centres, large municipalities, small towns, rural areas) and have publicly available provincial data. Using provincial averages provides snapshots for the provinces irrespective of differing local contexts. These reforms are detailed below, and are further elaborated on in our Technical Annex.

Case Study 1: Administrative Relief

As mentioned, the administrative load faced by police officers is considerable. As these tasks are not core policing services and do not involve high levels of physical, cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal skills, there is a real opportunity to integrate security personnel. Alberta has a total of 7,687 police officers,²¹ with an average yearly compensation (including salary and benefits) of over \$133,000.²² In Quebec, the median yearly compensation for the province's 15,622 police officers²³ is nearly \$117,000.²⁴ In comparison, a security professional draws a yearly compensation of just under \$53,000²⁵ in Alberta, and just over \$49,000²⁶ in Quebec.²⁷

We estimate that each year, there are over six million hours in Alberta, and nearly thirteen million in Quebec, in which these highly-trained officers are being paid handsomely to write reports and complete other paperwork and time-consuming administrative tasks. If we were to transfer this burden to security professionals, even with an assumed contractor margin of 20%, it

would result in annual savings of nearly \$362 million in Quebec and over \$216 million in Alberta.²⁸

However, some tasks will undoubtedly require a police officer's involvement at some point in the administrative process, whether to review and sign off on reports or to ensure rigour through supervision. With a more conservative estimate of 75% of required administrative duties being carried out by contractors (and the remaining 25% by officers), we can still realize annual savings of over \$271 million in Quebec and over \$162 million in Alberta.²⁹

Case Study 2: Auxiliary Police in Quebec

Security personnel could also be used as an auxiliary force for a number of different activities carried out by officers in the "gendarmerie" branch of the Quebec police. Officers in this branch carry out tasks related to territorial surveillance, patrol, answering calls from citizens, transport of suspects, and prevention activities, among others.³⁰ For example, in Montreal, 115 full-time police officers in the gendarmerie are deployed in the subway.³¹

Alberta has a total of 7,687 police officers, with an average yearly compensation of over \$133,000. In comparison, a security professional draws a yearly compensation of just under \$53,000.

Many tasks carried out by the gendarmerie branch could be performed without major complications, at least to some degree, by security agents with proper training. This could result in significant cost savings for the province without reducing service quality. Security agents would support officers, when needed, by taking over some less complex tasks, thus allowing officers to concentrate on their core police functions, namely the enforcement of laws, criminal investigation, and emergency response.

21. Patricia Conor et al., "Police resources in Canada, 2019," Statistics Canada, December 8, 2020, p. 26.

22. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

23. Statistics Canada, Table 35-10-0076-01: Police personnel and selected crime statistics, 2019.

24. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

25. This number represents average yearly compensation in Alberta.

26. This number represents the minimum yearly compensation in Quebec.

27. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.


28. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

29. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

30. Government of Quebec, *La desserte policière au Québec, Profil organisationnel 2015*, Ministère de la Sécurité publique du Québec, 2017, p. 7.

31. SVPM, Discover SPVM, Discover police work, Patrolling, Montréal's Métro (subway) officer, consulted May 10, 2021.

Figure 2-1



Note: Estimated costs of non-administrative service provision.
Sources: Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

Data from the provincial and municipal police forces in Quebec indicates that in 2015, more than two-thirds (70%) of permanent police officers worked in the gendarmerie.³² We anticipate that if security personnel were incorporated into the operations of the gendarmerie branch, absorbing 60% of non-core yet non-administrative tasks, estimated annual budget savings of nearly \$228 million could be realized in Quebec (see Figure 2-1).³³

We estimate a possible reduction in Quebec taxpayers' burden of between \$525 million and \$615 million per year.

Aside from the estimated 40% of an average officer's time spent on administration, 3.5% of permanent officers in Quebec are assigned wholly to management positions that are themselves direct administration.³⁴ We estimate that if 80% of these positions were provided by non-police officers, a reduction of over \$25 million dollars would be possible each year while still

maintaining quality service. Thus, by incorporating security personnel into both the gendarmerie and management positions in the Quebec police force mentioned in this case study, the province's taxpayers could see annual spending on police services reduced by over \$253 million dollars.³⁵

Options for Quebec

In the context of the two case studies discussed above, the Quebec government has a number of areas in which they can integrate security personnel to significantly reduce costs while freeing up officers' time to respond to more serious matters that truly require the presence of a police officer. We estimate a possible reduction in Quebec taxpayers' burden of between \$525 million and \$615 million per year, depending on the composition of the tasks and the police-to-security ratio involved (see Table 2-1). Considering that the operating expenditures on policing in 2018-2019 in Quebec were \$3.0 billion, these numbers represent a potential of between 17% and 20% in reduced annual operating expenditures.³⁶

32. Government of Quebec, *op. cit.*, footnote 30.

33. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

34. Government of Quebec, *op. cit.*, footnote 30, p. 8.

35. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

36. Authors' calculations. Statistics Canada, Juristat, Police resources in Canada, 2019, Table 2: Total expenditures on policing, current dollars, by province and territory, 2018/2019, 2019.

Table 2-1

Reduction in annual taxpayer burden through the use of licensed security personnel in Quebec*		
	Case Study 1 Savings – Full Security Support for Administrative Tasks	Case Study 1 Savings – Mixed Responsibility for Administrative Tasks (Conservative Estimate)
Administrative duties of a police officer	\$361,832,598	\$271,374,449
Case Study 2 - Gendarmerie	\$227,954,537	\$227,954,537
Case Study 2 – Management positions	\$25,382,282	\$25,382,282
Total reduction possible	\$615,115,417	\$524,657,267

*In the contexts discussed in Case Studies 1 and 2.
Sources: Authors’ calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

Case Study 3: Traffic Management in Alberta

Traffic management is an area where security personnel can easily support police officers, carrying out tasks like patrolling, directing traffic, and responding to the scene of a collision. Contracting out a part of traffic management can lead to substantial spending reductions. In Alberta, in addition to accidents with injuries, a police report must be filed if the estimated damage to all property and vehicles exceeds \$2,000.³⁷ This requires an officer to be present either at the scene or at a station to take the statement, non-core tasks which do not

We anticipate a reduced Alberta taxpayer burden of between \$171 million and \$225 million per year.

require high levels of physical, cognitive, emotional, and interpersonal skills.

Between 2014 and 2018, there were an average of 279 fatal collisions, 13,235 non-fatal injury accidents, and 127,213 property damage incidents annually in Alberta³⁸ at a total estimated police cost of over

\$17 million per year.³⁹ While fatal collisions require a police presence to process the scene, non-fatal injury or property damage accidents can easily be managed by security contractors alone. If we entrust security agents to perform the tasks necessary to process and manage traffic collisions, assuming again a contractor margin of 20%, we estimate annual savings of almost \$9 million.

Options for Alberta

In the context of the first and third case studies discussed above, whereby security personnel relieve police officers of their administrative burden and take charge of the management and reporting of most traffic collisions, Alberta can significantly reduce costs while freeing up officers’ time to focus on core job tasks. Combining these two case study estimates for the province, we anticipate a reduced Alberta taxpayer burden of between \$171 million and \$225 million per year, depending on the composition of the tasks and the police-to-security ratio involved (see Table 2-2). Considering that the operating expenditures on policing in 2018-2019 in Alberta were \$1.6 billion, these numbers represent a potential of between 11% and 14% in reduced annual operating expenditures.⁴⁰

37. Government of Alberta, Automobile collisions and insurance, consulted May 14, 2021.

38. Government of Alberta, “Alberta Traffic Collision Statistics Summary 2018,” Traffic Safety, Alberta Transportation, February 2021, p. 3.

39. Authors’ calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

40. Authors’ calculations. Statistics Canada, *op cit.*, footnote 36.

Table 2-2

Reduction in annual taxpayer burden through the use of licensed security personnel in Alberta*		
	Case Study 1 Savings – Full Security Support for Administrative Tasks	Case Study 1 Savings – Mixed Responsibility for Administrative Tasks (Conservative Estimate)
Administrative duties of a police officer	\$216,461,984	\$162,346,488
Case Study 3 – Traffic management	\$8,904,725	\$8,904,725
Total reduction possible	\$225,366,709	\$171,251,213

*In the contexts discussed in Case Studies 1 and 3.

Sources: Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

CHAPTER 3

The Gradual Integration of Security Personnel

The estimates in the above case studies assume that the transition to the use of security agents in the areas/capacities outlined happens overnight. This is, of course, an oversimplification for the sake of illustration. In reality, the introduction of security personnel into established police forces would be gradual, slowly replacing some retiring officers and some of those who leave the force for other reasons. As a result, the savings too would increase gradually.

Our simulation illustrates what a slow integration, aimed at a true incorporation over a period of 25 years, could look like. For both provinces, the measured transition occurs in such a way that over the 25-year period, the number of security personnel gradually rises while total personnel levels remain constant with 2019 staffing levels. This therefore does not take population (or police force) growth into account.

As can be seen in Figure 3-1, after 25 years, the proportion of police officers reaches around 77% in Alberta. For Quebec, the proportion of officers is slightly lower, but still around 72% of the force after 25 years.⁴¹

Figure 3-2 shows the savings as they gradually increase over time in this simulated slow reorganization. With larger numbers of officers on the force in Quebec (and a slightly higher attrition rate), we anticipate a steeper incline as compared to Alberta's gradual savings. Still, in both provinces, the potential annual savings are significant, reaching \$254 million for Quebec after 25 years, and \$126 million for Alberta.

We also expect that as police officers are increasingly able to focus on the core tasks of the job thanks to the offloading of additional tasks and the curtailment of mission creep, their job satisfaction will increase, and with it their motivation and the quality of policing. Conversely, absenteeism and turnover rates should decrease.⁴² This could potentially reduce the attrition rate in subsequent years, which might slow the transition somewhat, a point that more sophisticated future simulations could take into consideration.

Increased job satisfaction and reduced turnover will have a positive impact not only on the communities in which these officers serve, but also on the public purse once again through reduced training and management costs. Replacing an experienced police officer has been estimated to cost more than twice his or her annual salary.⁴³ Furthermore, with each security hire, the responsibility for onboarding, training, and management lies with the contractor and not the public sector directly. Therefore, the cost savings proposed in this model represent a minimum, as the cost of training police officers is considerable.

The introduction of security personnel into established police forces would be gradual, slowly replacing some retiring officers and some of those who leave the force for other reasons.

In addition, the level of job-specific knowledge required to complete core police functions means that high turnover can impair organizational performance and the quality of services delivered while replacement personnel are selected and trained.⁴⁴ Agencies with higher turnover also suffer reduced productivity.⁴⁵ Therefore, by increasing job satisfaction and reducing turnover, higher quality services can be provided to the public.

In Practice

Looking to entrepreneurs to support the police in a complementary fashion is a strategy that has been tried in a number of places. In the United Kingdom, evidence has shown that such contracting out does indeed allow police officers to refocus on their core tasks, which increased the quality of services provided to the community. As budgets have slowly been reduced over time and police forces have been required to try to do more with less, they have increased interorganizational collaboration and the utilization of private sector partners.⁴⁶ As a

41. Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

42. Henry L. Tosi, John Rizzo, and Neal P. Mero, *op. cit.*, footnote 13, p. 18.


43. W. Dwayne Orrick, "Calculating the Cost of Police Turnover," *Police Chief*, Vol. 69, No. 1, January 2001, pp. 100-103, cited in Jeremy M. Wilson et al., *Police Recruitment and Retention for the New Millennium: The State of Knowledge*, RAND Center on Quality Policing, 2010, p. 22.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

45. *Idem.*

46. Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services, *Increasing efficiency in the Police Service: The role of collaboration*, 2012, pp. 4-5.

Figure 3-1



Sources: Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

result, the private security industry has been growing rapidly. In 2009, the ratio of officers to security agents employed in the United Kingdom was just 6 to 5, or 1.2 officers per security agent.⁴⁷

In 2012, the Lincolnshire Police signed a 10-year contract with G4S, a private security company.⁴⁸ By outsourcing administrative duties and some minor tasks to G4S, they were able to save over £5 million (C\$6.8 million) in their first year,⁴⁹ and are projected to save £36 million (C\$49.3 million) over 10 years.⁵⁰ And as

47. Authors' calculations. Tim Prenzler, *Outsourcing of Policing Tasks: Scope and Prospects*, Report to the Australian Security Industry Association Limited, January 2013, p. 28.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

49. Sky News, "Lincolnshire Police Deal with G4S Saves £5m," June 24, 2013.

50. *Idem.*


As police officers are increasingly able to focus on the core tasks of the job, their job satisfaction will increase, and with it their motivation and the quality of policing.

costs fell, so did the crime rate, by 14% in the first year.⁵¹

Another partnership involving businesses provided increased crime prevention measures, and as a result, property crime in the form of successful burglaries fell by over half (from 31% to 13%) for those taking part in

51. BBC News, "Private firm G4S 'saved Lincolnshire Police £5m'," June 24, 2013.

Figure 3-2



Sources: Authors' calculations. See the Technical Annex at the end of this document.

the partnership trial,⁵² versus no reduction for businesses that were not part of the program.

A Model to Consider

In London, My Local Bobby (MLB) is a police-styled security firm founded by former police officers to work alongside police or other groups to solve crimes and prevent anti-social behaviour.⁵³ Since MLB was launched in 2016, there has been significant crime reduction in all areas where they operate, including marked successes in dealing with burglary and drug-dealing, among other offenses.⁵⁴ After seven months patrolling Woodford, East London, crime rates there dropped an impressive 43%.⁵⁵

Although a service privately paid for by businesses and residents, MLB is a model for how a security comple-

ment could operate to formally support police forces. MLB is supported by their parent company, TM-Eye, which has successfully prosecuted more than 400 criminals with a 100% conviction rate, and is now even carrying out murder inquiries.⁵⁶

In the United Kingdom, evidence has shown that such contracting out does indeed allow police officers to refocus on their core tasks, which increased the quality of services provided to the community.

Recently, London neighbourhood Richmond Green hired MLB to help address “lockdown lawlessness” during the

52. Ruth Montgomery and Curt Taylor Griffiths, *op. cit.*, footnote 18, p. 36.

53. My Local Bobby, About us, consulted May 12, 2021.

54. *Idem.*

55. Kieran Williams, “‘Private police force’ paid for by residents branded ‘new breed’ of copper,” *The Daily Mirror*, January 24, 2020.

56. Rebecca Camber, “Britain’s first ‘private police force’ has caught 400 criminals with a 100 per cent conviction rate after taking on cases regular officers are too busy to look at,” *The Daily Mail*, February 2, 2018.

COVID-19 pandemic.⁵⁷ The local police station had closed in 2018 due to budget cuts, and residents report that since then, police have been slow to respond to smaller incidents. TM-Eye and MLB operate in a space left unserved, as police chiefs admit they do not have the money to investigate high-volume crimes like shoplifting, and overextended officers complain that they have reached a breaking point.⁵⁸

Conclusion

As fiscal pressures continue to mount, acknowledging and utilizing the resources and support available through highly trained and qualified security personnel is a must. Not only are these security professionals able to take over non-core tasks that occupy an inordinate amount of officers' time, but they can also offer support in some less technical areas, such as the gendarmerie in Quebec and traffic management in Alberta. As we have modelled through case studies, total budget reductions would be substantial, and the integration of security personnel can be stretched over many years so as to gradually redirect police to their core tasks while ensuring that performance standards are maintained, and even improved.

As fiscal pressures continue to mount, acknowledging and utilizing the resources and support available through highly trained and qualified security personnel is a must.

The integration of security personnel has been shown to be effective in reducing both costs and crime in the United Kingdom, among other places. While it may not satisfy those crying to "defund the police," these professionals can help make the delivery of police services more effective in addition to saving taxpayer money, all while allowing officers to do more with less without compromising the quality of services the population receives.

57. Samuel Fishwick, "The deeply divisive rise of London's private police," *Evening Standard*, August 13, 2020.

58. Rebecca Camber, *op. cit.*, footnote 56.

TECHNICAL ANNEX

Case Study 1: Administrative Relief

Alberta and Quebec

In the first case study, we estimate the reduction in the taxpayer burden resulting from the contracting of licensed security personnel to take over unskilled administrative work currently being carried out by highly trained police officers.

As both Alberta and Quebec employ large numbers of personnel in vastly different environments (metropolitan centres, large municipalities, small towns, rural areas, etc.), remuneration varies from context to context. As such, it is important to note that our compensation estimates are based on the publicly available data for those provinces, with compensation being an underestimate for officers in some areas and an overestimate in others. Nonetheless, a provincial average provides a helpful snapshot for a province as a whole, irrespective of different local contexts.

For this estimation, we use the total number of police in the provinces of Alberta (7,687) and Quebec (15,622)⁵⁹ and calculate, using the average wage for Alberta (\$51.58) and the median wage for Quebec (\$43.59),⁶⁰ the annual cost of a police officer for taxpayers. This estimate includes employer-paid health and medical benefits and pension plan as well as pay for vacations and statutory holidays, and operates under the assumption of a 40-hour week, as outlined in many collective agreements with police forces in both provinces.

In Quebec, for a CEGEP-educated job, the benefit rate is 28.99% of the wage.⁶¹ In Alberta, the calculation of benefits is a little more involved due to the absence of publicly available data. To calculate the benefit rate, we take the total operating expenditures on policing in current dollars (for 2018-2019)⁶² and multiply it by the esti-

mated 65%⁶³ that is spent on salaries and wages to get an estimated expenditure cost for salary and benefits alone. This is then divided by the number of officers to arrive at a per officer salary estimate for 2018-2019 in Alberta. We do the same for the estimated 16% spent on benefits to get an estimated expenditure on benefits per officer. Then, by calculating a ratio of benefits to wage, we can determine the additional percentage to be added to the wage estimation to compute a compensation amount inclusive of benefits. The benefit rate we calculate is 24.62%.

These estimations do not include overtime, shift differential pay, or any wage bonuses that an officer might be entitled to, and so are likely to be underestimates.

We then use estimates of 100% of officers' administrative hours (40% of their overall hours⁶⁴) as well as 75% in the more conservative estimate (which works out to 30% of their overall hours). For this portion of their hours, we replace their hourly wage by the hourly wage of security agents in the respective provinces (\$20.35 in Alberta⁶⁵ and \$18.34 in Quebec⁶⁶). Benefits rates are assumed to be equal for police officers and security professionals in each province due to a number of factors, including unionization, which increases the likelihood of comprehensive benefits packages and medical insurance as well as employer-sponsored pension plans.⁶⁷

Incorporating an assumed 20% profit margin for the security company, we arrive at minimum annual savings of nearly \$362 million in Quebec and over \$216 million in Alberta, if 100% of administrative tasks were indeed taken over by security contractors. If only 75% of officers' administrative hours are taken over, we calculate potential annual budgetary relief of over \$271 million in Quebec and over \$162 million in Alberta.

59. Statistics Canada, Table 35-10-0076-01: Police personnel and selected crime statistics, 2019.

60. Government of Alberta, Jobs, Job search resources, Occupations and salaries in Alberta, Wages and salaries in Alberta, Police officers (except commissioned), consulted May 6, 2021; Government of Canada, Jobs, Find a job, Job bank, Trend Analysis, Wages, Police Officer (4311), Hourly wages by community/area, Quebec, consulted May 6, 2021.

61. Quebec Institute of Statistics, Cost of social benefits and paid non-working hours and workforce covered according to the skill level of the National Occupational Classification, Quebec, public sector, 2019, consulted April 15, 2021.

62. Statistics Canada, Juristat, Police resources in Canada, 2019, Table 2: Total expenditures on policing, current dollars, by province and territory, 2018/2019, 2019.

63. Patricia Conner *et al.*, "Police resources in Canada, 2019," Statistics Canada, December 8, 2020, p. 5.

64. Aili Malm *et al.*, "Research Summary Report: A 30 Year Analysis of Police Service Delivery and Costing," Centre for Criminal Justice Research, University College of the Fraser Valley, August 2005, p. 9.

65. Average hourly wage. Government of Alberta, Jobs, Job search resources, Occupations and salaries in Alberta, Wages and salaries in Alberta, Security guards and related security service occupations, consulted May 6, 2021.

66. Minimum hourly wage. Government of Quebec, *Decree respecting security guards*, Chapter D-2, ss. 2 and 6, RRQ, 1981, c. D-2, r. 1; OC 441-84, s. 1, article 4.07, 2020.

67. Tingting Zhang, "Effects of Occupational Licensing and Unions on Labour Market Earnings in Canada," *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 57, No. 4, December 2019, p. 809.

Case Study 2: Auxiliary Police

Quebec

We use the breakdown by branch for the police in Quebec as outlined in a 2015 government report: 70% of the province's officers (provincial and municipal officers) are in the gendarmerie, 13.6% are assigned to investigations, 11.5% are assigned to support services, 3.5% are permanently assigned to management and administration, and 1.4% are assigned to emergency measures.⁶⁸

We assume, as in the first case study, that 40% of the work done by gendarmerie officers is administrative tasks. Of the remaining 60%, we assume that it can be divided up among security personnel and police officers in a ratio of 60:40, whereby 60% of the non-administrative tasks carried out in the gendarmerie sector (namely territorial surveillance, patrol, answering calls from citizens, transport of suspects, and prevention activities) can be performed by security personnel. This leaves 40% of these non-administrative tasks—those more directly related to the core functions of police work—to be carried out by police officers. The same wage, benefits, and contractor margins described in the first case study are used, with the same assumption of a 40-hour week for a full calendar year. We also use the same breakdown of median wages and benefits for officers and security personnel as in the first case study.

We estimate that there are over 13.6 million officer hours spent doing non-administrative tasks in the gendarmerie in Quebec, costing a total of over \$767 million per year. If licensed security personnel were included in the operations of this sector, taking over 60% of these tasks, an estimated annual budget reduction of nearly \$228 million could be achieved.

Of the province's total police force, 3.5% are permanently assigned to management and administration.⁶⁹ Most of these tasks could be carried out by civilians. Thus, we do not incorporate the 40% administration ratio to this calculation and instead use the total number of hours performed by these 3.5% of officers. Therefore, of the estimated 32,493,760 total police force hours worked in a given year, over one million of them are by officers permanently assigned to administration and management. We posit that 80% of this work can be transferred to security personnel, with little to no impact

on quality or public safety. Of the nearly \$64 million spent in this area alone each year, we estimate annual savings of over \$25 million.

The ratios described in this case study relating to the reasonable division between officers and security personnel are arbitrarily determined, and only serve as an indicator of approximately how much the police force budget can be realistically reduced by incorporating the skills and expertise of trained security personnel.

Case Study 3: Traffic Management

Alberta

Between 2014 and 2018, there were an average of 279 fatal collisions, 13,235 non-fatal injury accidents, and 127,213 property damage incidents annually in Alberta, as per publicly available provincial data.⁷⁰ A fatal collision requires 36.5 hours of police time, a collision causing non-fatal injuries requires 5 hours, and an accident with only property damage requires 1.5 hours.⁷¹ As fatal collisions require a police presence to process the scene, we assume that 40% of the time required to process and manage the scene must be carried out by police officers, and therefore that 60% of tasks can be carried out by security contractors. Thus, for each fatal accident, 14.6 hours of police time and 21.9 hours of security personnel are required. Using the same wage and benefit estimates as in our first case study, if we entrust security agents to manage the paperwork related to all traffic collisions, including fatal accidents in the above ratio, we estimate annual savings of almost \$9 million.

Transition Simulation

To be able to feasibly integrate security contractors, we suppose an attrition rate, which includes retirement as well as leaving the force for any other reason, based on an average of the previous three years' attrition in each of the provinces. In Quebec, the average attrition rate between 2017 and 2019 was 4.7%, and in Alberta, it was 3.4%.⁷² We assume these attrition rates both for police

68. Government of Quebec, *La desserte policière au Québec, Profil organisationnel 2015*, Ministère de la Sécurité publique du Québec, 2017, p. 8.

69. *Idem*.

70. Government of Alberta, "Alberta Traffic Collision Statistics Summary 2018," Traffic Safety, Alberta Transportation, February 2021, p. 3.

71. Paul de Leur, *Collision Cost Study Update FINAL report*, Capital Resource Intersection Safety Partnership, April 2018, p. 24.

72. Authors' calculations. Statistics Canada, Table 35-10-0076-01: Police personnel and selected crime statistics, 2017; Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 2017, Table 4: Hirings and departures of police officers, by province and territory, Canada, 2016/2017, 2017; Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 2018, Table 6: Hirings and departures of police officers, by province and territory, Canada, 2017/2018, 2018; Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 2019, Table 6: Hirings and departures of police officers, by province and territory, Canada, 2018/2019, 2019.

officers as well as security contractors (which is also built into our model), as numbers of departures for the latter were not publicly available.

Our transition simulation does not include the assumed retirement of the numbers of officers in each province who were eligible to retire as of 2019 (Quebec 13%, Alberta 6%).⁷³ As we assume they will be included as part of the attrition rates in subsequent years, they are left in the model so as not to assume a dramatic decrease of police officers in any given year. This assumption, like all others, is prudent. There could, hypothetically, be a year or two in which more officers retire, thus increasing the attrition rate for those specific years. Over the long term, however, the average attrition is expected to remain stable.

Our transition simulation relies on these attrition rates, the current number of officers in each of the provinces, the salary (and benefits) for full-time police officers and security personnel in each province, and a ratio of incorporation of licensed security personnel as “new hires.” The ratio of police to security personnel takes into account the tasks, responsibilities, and needs of the force, but would change depending on the performance management guidelines and standard service execution outlined in the security contract awarded through the competitive bidding process. For our purposes, we assume a 40% security personnel new hire rate for each year after the first.

In addition, in order to illustrate plainly and clearly the simplicity of the phasing-in process, we do not build in any of the assumptions, calculations, or savings from the aforementioned case studies that are not specifically mentioned in this simulation description.

For the cost savings, we simply incorporate the salary and benefits for police officers and security personnel for the year in question and subtract from the cost in year one, our baseline, as that represents full police staffing.

73. Statistics Canada, Police Resources in Canada, 2019, Table 6: Hirings and departures of police officers, by province and territory, Canada, 2018/2019, 2019.

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